Louisiana Civil Code

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CHAPTER 3 - OF OFFENSES AND QUASI OFFENSES

Art. 2315. A. Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it.

B. Damages may include loss of consortium, service, and society, and shall be recoverable by the same respective categories of persons who would have had a cause of action for wrongful death of an injured person. Damages do not include costs for future medical treatment, services, surveillance, or procedures of any kind unless such treatment, services, surveillance, or procedures are directly related to a manifest physical or mental injury or disease. Damages shall include any sales taxes paid by the owner on the repair or replacement of the property damaged. [Amended by Acts 1884, No. 71; Acts 1908, No. 120, §1; Acts 1918, No. 159, §1; Acts 1932, No. 159, §1; Acts 1948, No. 333, §1; Acts 1960, No. 30, §1; Acts 1982, No. 202, §1; Acts 1984, No. 397, §1; Acts 1986, No. 211, §1; Acts 1999, No. 989, §1, eff. July 9, 1999; Acts 2001, No. 478, §1]

Art. 2315.1. A. If a person who has been injured by an offense or quasi offense dies, the right to recover all damages for injury to that person, his property or otherwise, caused by the offense or quasi offense, shall survive for a period of one year from the death of the deceased in favor of:

(1) The surviving spouse and child or children of the deceased, or either the spouse or the child or children.

(2) The surviving father and mother of the deceased, or either of them if he left no spouse or child surviving.

(3) The surviving brothers and sisters of the deceased, or any of them, if he left no spouse, child, or parent surviving.

(4) The surviving grandfathers and grandmothers of the deceased, or any of them, if he left no spouse, child, parent, or sibling surviving.

B. In addition, the right to recover all damages for injury to the deceased, his property or otherwise, caused by the offense or quasi offense, may be urged by the deceased's succession representative in the absence of any class of beneficiary set out in Paragraph A.

C. The right of action granted under this Article is heritable, but the inheritance of it neither interrupts nor prolongs the prescriptive period defined in this Article.

D. As used in this Article, the words "child", "brother", "sister", "father", "mother", "grandfather", and "grandmother" include a child, brother, sister, father, mother, grandfather, and grandmother by adoption, respectively.

E. For purposes of this Article, a father or mother who has abandoned the deceased during his minority is deemed not to have survived him. [Acts 1986, No. 211, §2; Acts 1987, No. 675, §1; Acts 1997, No. 1317, §1, eff. July 15, 1997]

Art. 2315.2. A. If a person dies due to the fault of another, suit may be brought by the following persons to recover damages which they sustained as a result of the death:

(1) The surviving spouse and child or children of the deceased, or either the spouse or the child or children.

(2) The surviving father and mother of the deceased, or either of them if he left no spouse or child surviving.

(3) The surviving brothers and sisters of the deceased, or any of them, if he left no spouse, child, or parent surviving.

(4) The surviving grandfathers and grandmothers of the deceased, or any of them, if he left no spouse, child, parent, or sibling surviving.

B. The right of action granted by this Article prescribes one year from the death of the deceased.

C. The right of action granted under this Article is heritable, but the inheritance of it neither interrupts nor prolongs the prescriptive period defined in this Article.

D. As used in this Article, the words "child", "brother", "sister", "father", "mother", "grandfather", and "grandmother" include a child, brother, sister, father, mother, grandfather, and grandmother by adoption, respectively.

E. For purposes of this Article, a father or mother who has abandoned the deceased during his minority is deemed not to have survived him. [Acts 1986, No. 211, §2; Acts 1997, No. 1317, §1, eff. July 15, 1997]

Art. 2315.3. In addition to general and special damages, exemplary damages may be awarded upon proof that the injuries on which the action is based were caused by a wanton and reckless disregard for the rights and safety of the person through an act of pornography involving juveniles, as defined by R.S. 14:81.1, regardless of whether the defendant was prosecuted for his acts. [Acts 2009, No. 382, §1]

Art. 2315.4. In addition to general and special damages, exemplary damages may be awarded upon proof that the injuries on which the action is based were caused by a wanton or reckless disregard for the rights and safety of others by a defendant whose intoxication while operating a motor vehicle was a cause in fact of the resulting injuries. [Acts 1984, No. 511, §1]

Art. 2315.5. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, the surviving spouse, parent, or child of a deceased, who has been convicted of a crime involving the intentional killing or attempted killing of the deceased, or, if not convicted, who has been judicially determined to have participated in the intentional, unjustified killing or attempted killing of the deceased, shall not be entitled to any damages or proceeds in a survival action or an action for wrongful death of the deceased, or to any proceeds distributed in settlement of any such cause of action. In such case, the other child or children of the deceased, or if the deceased left no other child surviving, the other survivors enumerated in the applicable provisions of Articles 2315.1(A) and 2315.2(A), in order of preference stated, may bring a survival action against such surviving spouse, parent, or child, or an action against such surviving spouse, parent, or child for the wrongful death of the deceased.

An executive pardon shall not restore the surviving spouse's, parent's, or child's right to any damages or proceeds in a survival action or an action for wrongful death of the deceased. [Acts 1987, No. 690, §1; Acts 1991, No. 180, §1]

Art. 2315.6. A. The following persons who view an event causing injury to another person, or who come upon the scene of the event soon thereafter, may recover damages for mental anguish or emotional distress that they suffer as a result of the other person's injury:

(1) The spouse, child or children, and grandchild or grandchildren of the injured person, or either the spouse, the child or children, or the grandchild or grandchildren of the injured person.

(2) The father and mother of the injured person, or either of them.

(3) The brothers and sisters of the injured person or any of them.

(4) The grandfather and grandmother of the injured person, or either of them.

B. To recover for mental anguish or emotional distress under this Article, the injured person must suffer such harm that one can reasonably expect a person in the claimant's position to suffer serious mental anguish or emotional distress from the experience, and the claimant's mental anguish or emotional distress must be severe, debilitating, and foreseeable.

Damages suffered as a result of mental anguish or emotional distress for injury to another shall be recovered only in accordance with this Article. [Acts 1991, No. 782, §1]

Art. 2315.7. In addition to general and special damages, exemplary damages may be awarded upon proof that the injuries on which the action is based were caused by a wanton and reckless disregard for the rights and safety of the person through criminal sexual activity which occurred when the victim was seventeen years old or younger, regardless of whether the defendant was prosecuted for his or her acts. The provisions of this Article shall be applicable only to the perpetrator of the criminal sexual activity. [Acts 1993, No. 831, §1, eff. June 22, 1993]

Art. 2315.8. A. In addition to general and special damages, exemplary damages may be awarded upon proof that the injuries on which the action is based were caused by a wanton and reckless disregard for the rights and safety of a family or household member, as defined in R.S. 46:2132, through acts of domestic abuse resulting in serious bodily injury or severe emotional and mental distress, regardless of whether the defendant was prosecuted for his or her acts.

B. Upon motion of the defendant or upon its own motion, if the court determines that any action alleging domestic abuse is frivolous or fraudulent, the court shall award costs of court, reasonable attorney fees, and any other related costs to the defendant and any other sanctions and relief requested pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Article 863. [Acts 2014, No. 315, §1, eff. Aug. 1, 2014]

 

Art. 2315.9. A. In addition to general and special damages, a prevailing plaintiff shall also be awarded court costs and reasonable attorney fees in the appropriate district or appellate court upon proof that the injuries on which the action is based were caused by an act of terror or terrorism resulting in injury to the person or damage to the person’s property, regardless of whether the defendant was prosecuted for his acts.

 

B. The rights and remedies provided by this Article are in addition to any other rights and remedies provided by law.

 

C. As used in this Article, the terms shall be defined as follows:

 

(1) “Act of terror” or “terrorism” means the commission of any of the acts occurring primarily in this state and as enumerated in this Subparagraph, when the offender has the intent to intimidate or coerce the civilian population, influence the policy of a unit of government by intimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct of a unit of government by intimidation or coercion:

 

(a) Intentional killing of a human being.

 

(b) Intentional infliction of serious bodily injury upon a human being.

 

(c) Kidnapping of a human being.

 

(d) Aggravated arson upon any structure, watercraft, or movable.

 

(e) Aggravated criminal damage to property.

 

(2) “Terrorist” means a person who knowingly does any of the following:

 

(a) Commits an act of terror.

 

(b) Acts as an accessory before or after the fact, aids or abets, solicits, or conspires to commit an act of terror.

 

(c) Lends material support to an act of terror.

 

D. Upon motion of the defendant or upon its own motion, if the court determines that any action alleging an act of terror is frivolous or fraudulent, the court shall award costs of court, reasonable attorney fees, and any other related costs to the defendant and any other sanctions and relief requested pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Article 863.

E. An action under the provisions of this Article shall be subject to a liberative prescriptive period of two years. [Acts 2015, No. 337, §1, eff. Aug. 1, 2015]

Art. 2316. Every person is responsible for the damage he occasions not merely by his act, but by his negligence, his imprudence, or his want of skill.

Art. 2317. We are responsible, not only for the damage occasioned by our own act, but for that which is caused by the act of persons for whom we are answerable, or of the things which we have in our custody. This, however, is to be understood with the following modifications.

Art. 2317.1. The owner or custodian of a thing is answerable for damage occasioned by its ruin, vice, or defect, only upon a showing that he knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known of the ruin, vice, or defect which caused the damage, that the damage could have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable care, and that he failed to exercise such reasonable care. Nothing in this Article shall preclude the court from the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in an appropriate case. [Acts 1996, 1st Ex. Sess., No. 1, §1, eff. April 16, 1996]

Art. 2318. The father and the mother are responsible for the damage occasioned by their minor child, who resides with them or who has been placed by them under the care of other persons, reserving to them recourse against those persons. However, the father and mother are not responsible for the damage occasioned by their minor child who has been emancipated by marriage, by judgment of full emancipation, or by judgment of limited emancipation that expressly relieves the parents of liability for damages occasioned by their minor child.

The same responsibility attaches to the tutors of minors. [Acts 1984, No. 578, §1; Acts 2008, No. 786, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 2009]

Art. 2319. Neither a curator nor an undercurator is personally responsible to a third person for a delictual obligation of the interdict in his charge solely by reason of his office. [Acts 2000, 1st Ex. Sess., No. 25, §2, eff. July 1, 2001]

Art. 2320. Masters and employers are answerable for the damage occasioned by their servants and overseers, in the exercise of the functions in which they are employed.

Teachers and artisans are answerable for the damage caused by their scholars or apprentices, while under their superintendence.

In the above cases, responsibility only attaches, when the masters or employers, teachers and artisans, might have prevented the act which caused the damage, and have not done it.

The master is answerable for the offenses and quasi-offenses committed by his servants, according to the rules which are explained under the title: Of quasi-contracts, and of offenses and quasi-offenses.

Art. 2321. The owner of an animal is answerable for the damage caused by the animal. However, he is answerable for the damage only upon a showing that he knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known that his animal's behavior would cause damage, that the damage could have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable care, and that he failed to exercise such reasonable care. Nonetheless, the owner of a dog is strictly liable for damages for injuries to persons or property caused by the dog and which the owner could have prevented and which did not result from the injured person's provocation of the dog. Nothing in this Article shall preclude the court from the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in an appropriate case. [Acts 1996, 1st Ex. Sess., No. 1, §1, eff. April 16, 1996]

Art. 2322. The owner of a building is answerable for the damage occasioned by its ruin, when this is caused by neglect to repair it, or when it is the result of a vice or defect in its original construction. However, he is answerable for damages only upon a showing that he knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known of the vice or defect which caused the damage, that the damage could have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable care, and that he failed to exercise such reasonable care. Nothing in this Article shall preclude the court from the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in an appropriate case. [Acts 1996, 1st Ex. Sess., No. 1, §1, eff. April 16, 1996]

Art. 2322.1. A. The screening, procurement, processing, distribution, transfusion, or medical use of human blood and blood components of any kind and the transplantation or medical use of any human organ, human tissue, or approved animal tissue by physicians, dentists, hospitals, hospital blood banks, and nonprofit community blood banks is declared to be, for all purposes whatsoever, the rendition of a medical service by each and every physician, dentist, hospital, hospital blood bank, and nonprofit community blood bank participating therein, and shall not be construed to be and is declared not to be a sale. Strict liability and warranties of any kind without negligence shall not be applicable to the aforementioned who provide these medical services.

B. In any action based in whole or in part on the use of blood or tissue by a healthcare provider, to which the provisions of Paragraph A do not apply, the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving all elements of his claim, including a defect in the thing sold and causation of his injuries by the defect, by a preponderance of the evidence, unaided by any presumption.

C. The provisions of Paragraphs A and B are procedural and shall apply to all alleged causes of action or other act, omission, or neglect without regard to the date when the alleged cause of action or other act, omission, or neglect occurred.

D. As used in this Article:

(1) "Healthcare provider" includes all individuals and entities listed in R.S. 9:2797, this Article, R.S. 40:1299.39 and R.S. 40:1299.41 whether or not enrolled with the Patient's Compensation Fund.

(2) "The use of blood or tissue" means the screening, procurement, processing, distribution, transfusion, or any medical use of human blood, blood products, and blood components of any kind and the transplantation or medical use of any human organ, human or approved animal tissue, and tissue products or tissue components by any healthcare provider. [Added by Acts 1981, No. 611, §1; Acts 1990, No. 1091, §1; Acts 1999, No. 539, §2, eff. June 30, 1999]

Art. 2323. A. In any action for damages where a person suffers injury, death, or loss, the degree or percentage of fault of all persons causing or contributing to the injury, death, or loss shall be determined, regardless of whether the person is a party to the action or a nonparty, and regardless of the person's insolvency, ability to pay, immunity by statute, including but not limited to the provisions of R.S. 23:1032, or that the other person's identity is not known or reasonably ascertainable. If a person suffers injury, death, or loss as the result partly of his own negligence and partly as a result of the fault of another person or persons, the amount of damages recoverable shall be reduced in proportion to the degree or percentage of negligence attributable to the person suffering the injury, death, or loss.

B. The provisions of Paragraph A shall apply to any claim for recovery of damages for injury, death, or loss asserted under any law or legal doctrine or theory of liability, regardless of the basis of liability.

C. Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraphs A and B, if a person suffers injury, death, or loss as a result partly of his own negligence and partly as a result of the fault of an intentional tortfeasor, his claim for recovery of damages shall not be reduced. [Amended by Acts 1979, No. 431, §1; Acts 1996, 1st Ex. Sess., No. 3, §1, eff. April 16, 1996]

Art. 2324. A. He who conspires with another person to commit an intentional or willful act is answerable, in solido, with that person, for the damage caused by such act.

B. If liability is not solidary pursuant to Paragraph A, then liability for damages caused by two or more persons shall be a joint and divisible obligation. A joint tortfeasor shall not be liable for more than his degree of fault and shall not be solidarily liable with any other person for damages attributable to the fault of such other person, including the person suffering injury, death, or loss, regardless of such other person's insolvency, ability to pay, degree of fault, immunity by statute or otherwise, including but not limited to immunity as provided in R.S. 23:1032, or that the other person's identity is not known or reasonably ascertainable.

C. Interruption of prescription against one joint tortfeasor is effective against all joint tortfeasors. [Amended by Acts 1979, No. 431, §1; Acts 1987, No. 373, §1; Acts 1988, No. 430, §1; Acts 1996, 1st Ex. Sess., No. 3, §1, eff. April 16, 1996]

Art. 2324.1. In the assessment of damages in cases of offenses, quasi offenses, and quasi contracts, much discretion must be left to the judge or jury. [Acts 1984, No. 331, §3, eff. Jan. 1, 1985]

Art. 2324.2. A. When the recovery of damages by a person suffering injury, death, or loss is reduced in some proportion by application of Article 2323 or 2324 and there is a legal or conventional subrogation, then the subrogee's recovery shall be reduced in the same proportion as the subrogor's recovery.

B. Nothing herein precludes such persons and legal or conventional subrogees from agreeing to a settlement which would incorporate a different method or proportion of subrogee recovery for amounts paid by the legal or conventional subrogee under the Louisiana Worker's Compensation Act, R.S. 23:1021, et seq. [Acts 1989, No. 771, §1, eff. July 9, 1989]